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REPRIEVE IN VIET NAM

One of the by-products of the struggle between communism and

fre e dom is a kind of geographic schizophrenia in the Far East.

On the

fringes of communist power in Asia one finds a split Korea, a partitioned

V . et Nam and two Chinas.

sides as temporary.

In each case the division is regarded on both

Mao Tse-tung vow s that he will take Formosa and

Chiang Kai-shek reiterates that the nationalists will return to the Asian

mainland .

Syngman Rhee grows impatient to join the northern half of

his country to the Republic of Korea and the communists in turn insist

that sooner or later the Korean peninsula will be unified by them.

Ho Chih

Minh regards Viet Nam south of the 17th paralell as only temporarily out

of h i s grasp.

Ngo Dinh Diem 1s confident that eventually the country

will be reunited under the free government which he now leads in Saigon.

With the possible exception of the Formosa-China split, it is

reasonable to assume that these competitors are correct in regarding

the various divisions as temporary.

The partitions have occurred in

-2-

nations which are contiguous(again excepting
1

Formos~ and otherwise

quite similar in race, culture, language and outlook.

Although Korea,

VietNam and China have been divided several times before in h i story

invariably these centripetal forces have drawn them together again.

American policy at least towards Korea and Viet Nam has

generally supported the concept of unification.

It has also been a policy

of negative preference, our principal concern being that these countries

should not be unified by the Chinese communi sts, or those responsive

to them.

We have gone to great and expensive lengths to sustain this

preference.

To save Korea from communist unification we remobilized

tW

our armed forces, engaged

I' large part of them on the distant battle-

fields of that peninsula and have spent billions of dollars to maintai n

the Republic under Syngman Rhee.

To preserve Formosa from the

same fate we have allocated enormous sums to the Chinese nationalists,

stationed a fleet between the island and the mainland and even threatened
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to g o to war ourselves.

In VietNam, we backed the French and non-communist

VietNamese allied with them with billions of dollars in aid.

While we

have not actually committed ourselves to war to prevent communist

()'~ IJ, ~ 11~;
unficati on~ it

was not for want of official voices advocating such a course.

Since the defeat of the French Expeditionary force/ in the great

battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, our policy in VietNam has supported

~ .
who ~edicated

1t.

(JJ

not merely anti -communism but Vietnamese

"

,....

"

unifying VietNam on the basis of full national independence.

our policy has

~

to

While

become more pos i tive, our activity in VietNam has

.Jt.(~
~more

e....u ~ ~

modest and so have our words.

It is somewhat ironic

therefore that where we are doing the least ~~ the

prospects for success are the best.

Not only is there a good chance

of realiz i ng the negative objective of preventing the communist

unification of VietNam, there is even the possibility of a positive

advance of freedom.

ac

A key to this anomaly is to be found in the charter of the man

"

4

who now heads the free goverrunent of Viet Nam.

Te p n• 1

1•

.e ~

leadership 1s a revealing index to the situation in any country.

That

~

is the case, whether haau ehip is regarded primarily as molding the

forces within a sociefo r as giving them expression.

There is a

difference in a United K ingdom headed by a Churchill and by an Eden.

A subtle change has taken place in the United States ance leadership

passed to the team in the unfortunate incapacitation of the President.

It is difficult to envision the direction in which India might have

gone in the past quarter century without first a Gandhi and then a

Nehru and in that order.

In some respects, the leadership factor as a molder rather than

an expressor of the social forces in a country is more significant

in Asia than in the West at the present

(

tim~

The recent shock of independence has left these countries

in a very amorphous state.

They are nations turning on a kind of giant
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potter's wheel.

The fingers which shape them before the clay hardens

will have much to do with their ultimate forms.

It is not by accident that elections in many Asian countries are

being conducted with ballots which show the portraits of contesting

candidates side by side.

More than a technique of voting .is involved;

there is a certain symbolism.

The voter tears the ballot apart,

deposits his preference carefully in the box and casts the other into

the dust.

If Viet Nam has not set in the communist mold as was almost

universally expected a year or so ago, it is due in large part to the

man who heads the free government in the southern half of the country.

A year ago Ngo Dinh Diem was a lonely figure in Saigon.

He had beeh

brought back from self-imposed exile abroad to serve as President

when the Communist tide in VietNam wa• at its

:::t::'

He inherited

a government in chaos, run by a coalition whose only clairn.f.o authority
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were

~

guns and

~ influence

with the Ex-Emperor Bao Dai.

It

was composed of the gangsters<' and ex-river pirates of the Binh

Xuyen semi-secret organization, the mystical quasi-religious sects

of the countryside known as the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai and by colonial

::Cwtk!J

li hangers-on.

The demoralized Vietnamese army was a

separate force, with a chief-of- staff nourishing expectations of

satYo.yky
establishing a military

-~

m south VietNam.

This weird

conglomeration was held grimly together by the French Ministry for

the As so cia ted States and the French Expeditionary Corp sf\ Bno Dai,

who bore the title of

~hie£

of State served as the

instrumentali~l',:~~'~)

orders and edicts from Cannes on the French Rivera.

While the various elements of power alternately vied and

cooperated with each other in the struggle for power in Saigon, the

Communist Viet Minh under Ho Chih M i nh strengthened their grip

on the country.

.

The Geneva truce had consigned the northern half

of the country to the Viet Minh and they promptly fastened on it an
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author i tarian regime modeled after that of Communist China.

Below

the 17th parallel, undergrou nd Communist cadres and organizers w e r e the

real power in tn.uch of the countryside.

They were the government even

where officials nominally responsive to Saigon sat in the provincial

and local offices.

The people accepted Communist leadership partly in

terror but mostly because there was no real Vietnamese alternative

in Saigon.

In the jungle of <..:olonial decay,

co~·ruption

and military defeat

which characterized Saigon in 1954, Diem assumed the presidency

with few assets other than his nationalism, his personal incorruptability

and courage and his idealistic determination to create a free Viet Nam.

In addition, he had s ome cautious support from the American Embassy,

the gratitude of several hundred th ousand poverty- stricken refugees

whom he had insisted upon evacuating from the communist north, and

the sympathy of a few small Vietnamese nationalist organizations.
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Diem found few allies among the French and Vietnamese officials

and military officers who crowded into Saigon in the wake of the defeat

at Dien Bien Phu.

The Army leaders ignored his directives and

constantly threatened him with rebellion.

When Diem showed his

opposition to corruption the Binh Xuyen tossed warning bombs into

his residence.

Colonial hacks, with straight faces, found him 'unpopular''·

French colons complained of his "stubborness" and "inexperience".

w~ ~ w..l~~ ~ ~ 1 ~~~
'i1h:ts e

government

wet

mio~ht

e ei~Pl8 t!fta ~ n the authority of the Saigon

be extende4 into the south Vietnamese country side,

the Hoa Hao and Gao Daist sects branished their independent armed

bands at the upstart in Saigon who threatened their rights.

The "rights!'

it might be noted were government subsidies and autonomous control of

large areas of the countryside.

In these areas the sects had the

unchallenged pr stvilege of exploiting the inhabitants in return for

"protection", 'ystical quasi-religious services and anti-communism.

r

9

~iem

_.........~,

~ ~ ) .,) ;\ _. ~JJ.""
constituted a threat to all these special interests

colonial bureaucracy, tA e :a;nb

~ r h:usal

x ...ye.a

•aelce k€1

9

;...the sects"- the

and the ••

~

~~~
dt?s allied with Bao Dai.

1

reactio~took

Their

the form

of subversion of his constructive program by inertia , outright

opposition and conspiracy to bring about his removal.

The not very

remote danger of the Viet Minh seemed to concern them far less

than the immediate
~~L

'

_,

~.,..-

~~£ Diem.

//

~

l:n•·

~~ -r~~~.

.,4......
£

~ ""-

_ . , l -'
J

~

.,t.

In Saigon, in the fall of 1954, the tea-cup gossip

political career, if not his life, in days and even

~ ~'-k
...

..~.~ ~

~

measured ~ ~- • ~

hours .~

~..~
D. em acted
1

"

'.
r~ 1

as though it would last forever.

A w
1\.

~~ .!1.~

the clamor of opposition rose.

O utside the Palace of Independence,

)
The

~
more ~

ignored it, the more

furious it became.

He was critized abroad for doing nothing and at horne for d o ing

too much.

Actually, he was doing the only thing he could do.

He

was manuevering to free himself irom the web of corruption and
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decadence and the v/'. /stiges of a

1

,

•

8

colonial~

in which he had been

enmeshed from the moment he assumed the Presidency.

He was attempting

to separate and dissolve the strands of this web which stretched from Paris

and Cannes to Saigon and into the Vietnamese provinces.

He used

his meager resources with great political skill to accomplish this

purpose.

Actually each core of Diem's opposition in 1954 was a part of

the bankrupt legacy which he inherited when he assumed the Presidency.

Put together, they revealed why half of Ebax VietNam had fallen

to the Communist leader Ho Chih Minh and the balance threatened

despite the presence of a French Expeditionary Force of 300, 000 men

and the lavish expenditures of billions in American aid.

The case of the Vietnamese army was symptomatic of the

whole.

This army was trained by the French and equipped and

s q:>ported by the United States.

It was initially designed not

ll
;p int& lly as an instrumentality of a free Vietnamese Government but as a
~L
supplement to French Expeditionary Corps to assist in holding back the
/...

communist Viet Minh.

Despite modern training and copious

suppl~it

~

failed to

~

effectiv e ly even in this l imited function.

After the fighting

carne to an end, moreover, it became a serious divisive force in south

Viet Narn.

of national

When Diem attempted to convert the army into an element

strengt~

the chief-of- sta~wlro ::as a V,..etnarnese

~f

French

~ ~ ~··~ ~

w;'

citizenship openly defied his orders.

He war 99hheiwh

~

~~~
""*l:R F

als from the French Expeditionary Corps or those issuing

from Bao Dai in Cannes.

When Dicrn•s' stubbornes~ forced the removal of the rebellious

chie£.of-staff last November, the first step was taken in unravelling the

strands of the web which had held him a virtual prisoner in the presidential

Palace.

He had in effect shifted the Vietnamese army from an independent

and obstructive position into one subordinate to his government.

Had he

not been successful there would have been no opportunity to push a constructi/e

12

program in VietNam.

The gulf which

already separated the army from the

V etnamese people could only have grown larger.

th~s

In the end,

force would

{ hav~n all prob~b~lityj degenerated into an oppressive war-lordism and by

further alienating the people paved the way for the triumph of

C<J·~;

the~Viet

Minh throughout the country.
~y

Diem's challenge came from the Binh Xuyen and the sects,

"
particularly the Hoa Hao.

within the government.

The Binh Xuyen was literally a government

It was the organized brotherhood of the corrupt

and the lawless in and around Saigon-Cholon.

Backed by regular armed

bands, it had grown powerful on extortion, the drug traffic, gambling

and other questiorable activities.

By breaking its ties with the communists

who had previously bought it off, the Binh Xuyen had risen to a

1foo•#
position of quasi-respectibility at least in Colonial circles.

"

Although

the organization continued to tap the revenues of illicit occupations,
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the .S,..~
its leaders became pillars of strength in/government .

Its leaderf

~

--r~~·
served as president before

,.....

e£ s Mjji

gf the

a e p:".

Diem. a~d.

ltis son wcrn tiw teeeliioao dti...,

When Diem came to power, Bao Dai took

the precaution of placing control of the police ps

gendamerie in the hands of the Binh Xuyen.

"

"el

and the national

It became, therefore,

aJ- ,...u...

the principal enforcer a ! Ca'!e-::f the law in Saigon-Cholon.

.

What the Binh Xuyen was to

was to the countryside.

~s•.:ti~th~Ha~~ N-,)

Their armed bands, supported by

subsidies from Saigon and by exactions from the peasants held the

villages in a state of acquiescent terror.

Previous governments in Saigon had made

t~r

peace with

(J'V

these groups by buying them d.f doing nothing to curb their
1'-

Leaaex s of e'he !Hnh

~uyen

w li Hoa Hao

Having little support among the
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people, the succession of ineffective governments in Saigon had to

rely increasingly on these ,6ppressors of the people to preserve

even the fiction of ruling.

~:1~·1.

,

H....·~"·'

they ~the people.

r

The more they relied on them, the mre

When Diem began to call a halt to the patronizing of the Binh

Xuyen and the sects, he was called ''inexperienced" and "uncompromising••.

When he closed the gambling casinos in Saigon-Cholon on which the

Binh Xuyen relied for a large part of its revenue, he was called a

"mad man".

When he cut off the subsidies to the sects, it was "the

end".

Diem ignored these criticisms and the repeated exhortations

to compromise with the dissident groups.

In the meantime he was

strengthening the government's control over the Vietnamese

army~ ~------

command and persuading 1 eading generals of the Cao Dai sect to

join the nationalist cause.

With the Hoa Hao and the Binh Xuyen

--
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however, there could be no compromise.

They would accept no

arrangement which impaired their privileged position of atltonomous

D em could not concede that and still expect to lead the

power.

Vietnamese people/sensing their power slipping the Binh X uyen and

the Hoa Hao launched a simultaneous rebellion in an effort to

overthrow Diem in the spring of 1955.

Bao Dai who had ·not dared to

remove the President because of the latter 1 s growing influence m

VietNam and his support from the United States, made a circuito us

attempt to aid the rebels .

As soon as the revolution had broken out,

he switched chiefs-of-staff of the army in order to p revent the government

from dealing with the outbreak.

balance.

For 24 hours Diem's fate hung in

In the end, however, Bao Dai's action was ignored.

The

army remained loyal to Diem and after a brief and bloody struggle

..,J~~~
,.

in the streets of Saigon-Cholon the revolt was crushed.

Both the Binh Xuyen and the Hoa Hao were driven from the

,..

-
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capitol.

The remnants of the Binh Xuyen fled to the swamps along the

river some miles south of Saigon.

It was from this area that they had

originally emerged as river pirates to develop the organization that

"

eventually held all Saigon-Cholon in its grasp.

to the west.

The Hao Hao retreated

Broken into small bands, they took refuge in

tift

remote

mountains near the Cambodian borders.

The power of both of these dissident groups has been broW en.

ru..L.t '.

~~

v-~ they still retain a capacity for harrassing the government it is

"-

on the level of piracy and

band~try.

Both organizations are reported

to be negotiating with the Viet Minh in an effort to recoup their

shattered fortunes.

If they are successful, however, it will be

a measure of the gDowing weakness of the communists not of their

strength.

By accepting the ''war of the sects", rather than •

-

permit~

a continuance of the antonomous power of the Binh Xuyen and the Hoa
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Hao which was the price of peace, Diem lost the pt:op of several

thousand armed mercanaries in the conflict with the communists.
~

~ giving

tangible evidence of a leadership in Sa gon that would act

for and not against the people, he gained far more.

the loyalty of the national army.

He gained

He gained the confidence of numerous

V i etnamese who had been exploited and degraded by the Binh Xuyen,

the sects and their accomplices among the French colons.

He gained

the respect of free foreign nations and even the communists who

recognized that a dangerous opponent had appeared in Saigon.

In a recent plebescite in south Viet Nam, Diem 1 s picture

was placed in the ballot box and that of Bao Dai discarded by almost

all of the 6 million people who voted.

apparent that this would be the result.

significant following if,

~n fact,

Before the election it was

Bao Dai had long since lost any

~

he had ever had one in Viet

Na~

key role in th...,e conspiracy to overthrow Di~ has been the last

,.Mis
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strawfwhat was implied in this election, however, was more important

than the actual confirmation of the Ex-Emperor's unpopularity.

The

elevation of Diem to chief -of- state was an indication that the people

wanted a goverrunent which would derive its power primarily from them.

~

It was a reflection of their search for a leader/t\Vould respond to their

needs rather than to those of a foreign power and

allied with it.

t~

native groups

They sensed that Diem could provide that kind of

..jb
leader ship.

It is significant that not onl y Bao Dai but Viet Minh as well

t<> pnoeut the eleelieu.

~

"

P- 1 M,.o~'

aett ~h4.
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Diem has come an incredible distance in less than two years.

He has taken what was a lost cause of freedom in Viet Nam and breathed

new life into it.

Until now, the principal challenge which has confronted

him has been to sweet away the accumulated debris of a half-century of

colonial inertia.

That challenge has been met with great political skill .

The road ahead for Diem, however, is in some ways more

difficult than the one he has already negotiated .

At the present time, he

weilds great personal power 1n south Viet Nam, comparable to that of

Ho Chih Minh in the north.

His principal task now is to translate this

power into a people 1 s power .

H e must lead in the construction of a

free nation almost from the ground up and to do so under the constant

pressure of the

~

Viet ~.

The task involves 1n the first instance the development of new

political institutions which will provide adequate channels of representation

from the people to the government.

Deposing Bao Dai has cleared the

way for this effort and Diem has indicated that he will act promptly to

20
establish a constitutional government.

The old opera house in Saigon

is even now being refitted to house an elected constituent assembly when

it is convened.

He has also shown an awareness of the need to tackle promptly

the vast problems of economic and social reconstruction which exist in

south Viet Nam.

These affect primarily the people of the rural areas

who constitute the great bulk of the population.

Edicts have already been

promulgated to alleviate the conditions of the farmers and now that the

dissidents have been brought under control, it should be possible to carry

them out with increasing effectiveness.

There is also the need to perfect the armed forces.

The "war

of the sects" indicated that there had been a vast improvement in the

morale and leadership of the Army since Diem has been in office.

comments of

Gener~ O':~el,

Recent

head of the United States military

mission at Saigon, also reflect very favorably on the national army.
~)

need

exi~ts~n

~

Viet Nam

as in most Asian

7 ,;--

countrie~here

A

men with weapons

have long been associated with oppression to root the army deeply in the
populace.
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These are the principal challenges which confront the Diem

government.

There are others, including the development of a whole

new set of attitudes and relationships with respect to foreign nations .

fr/)AA~
It is not easy to pass quickly from the bitternes ses engendered b y

"

colonial dependency into new ties based upon national equality and

mutual benefit.

conflict is very

alone ,

Yet the need to do so in a world of sharp ideological

great~dea\ing

with these problems Diem is no longer

He has a growing following among young articulate Vietnamese

and increasing mass support .

~

~so has the assistance of the United States and othe, free
nations.

Before the Diem government came to power, American aid was

probably more ineffective in Viet Nam than anywhere else in the world .

It is now a positive asset in the situation.

It should be noted, however,

that large-scale aid can be at best only a stop - gap, not only in VietNam

but in any country where it is employed .

The efforts of the people them-

selves must ultimately provide the key to genuine freedom .

American
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aid is not a panacea.

It is helpful if it stimulates the constructive

It can be wasteful and harmful if it serves

energies of the recipients .

to stifle those energies by building unnecessary reliance on this

country.

The Vietnamese have not removed their dependency on one

foreign country only to shift it to another.

Jl--

·
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ow in a difficult transition fTom a coloni'al o a fi'"ee

base and assistance from the United States can b£

oi Earticular importan..

at this time provided it is consciously and intelligently designed to put a

1n the long run, the free south is in a better position than th

communist north to unify all of Viet Nam.

Its advantag

liee;;;nobonly: i

a superiority of resources but in tlie funaamental difference be we n

~edom

and totalitarianism .

While the north therefore is lik:e1y to come

available in Viet Nam which can supply the basis for an independent

national existence if they are effectively utilized.

The economy of the

country, however, is now in a difficult transition from a colonial to an

independent base.

Assistance from the United States, therefore, can be

of particular importance at this time.

It must be designed consciously

and intelligently to help put a strong economic floor under Vietnamese

'~

independence if it is to be useful.

The free south is potentially in a better position than the

communist north to unify VietNam.

Its advantage lies not only in a

superiority of resources but in the fact that it is oriented towards

freedom rather than totalitarianism .

While the north is likely to come

increasingly under the domination of communist China) the south can

grow steadily more independent.

In short, Diem's star is likely to

;J/iA'. -1-o
remain in the ascendancy and that of Ho Chih Minh MliiCl fade because

the former is following a course which more closely meets the needs

and aspirations of the Vietnamese peop le.
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This likelihood may well explain the sense of urgency which

the communists have exhibited on the question of unifying the country.

It may even lead them to attempt a military coup before it is too late.

If Diem continues to pursue the building of a free nation in south Viet Nam

with the same perceptiveness, courage and sure-handedness which he has

so far displayed, he will be ready for elections on unification when the·

conditions for a free choice exist in Viet Narn .

willing to accept them at that time?

Will the Viet Minh be

It is doubtful1 but if they do, it

v;::rti ~

~ be N go Dinh Diem 1 s picture that will go in the ballot box while that of
Ho Chih Minh is cast into the dust .

